Greg Combet, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Procurement, today announced that two further milestones have been achieved in the program to upgrade the RAAF’s Hornet fleet.
We ran another MRAP story this morning at Military.com that Greg Grant over at DoD Buzz previewed a few weeks ago.
The military is pressing its case for MRAP-like vehicles that are able to endure the rigors of the kind of terrain found in Afghanistan. This is a smart move on the part of the Pentagon, which is admitting that the current MRAP is a bank vault on wheels and not suited to austere environments where paved roads and structurally sound bridges are not the norm.
The interesting thing about the story though -- and something I'd like your thoughts on -- is the convergence of the JLTV program, the resulting protest delay and this new urgent need. To what extend is the NorGrum/Boeing/Oshkosh/Textron protest delaying or inhibiting the options for fulfilling this MRAP-ATV request? Seems to me if the players weren't hung up in protest fights over the JLTV demonstration phase, some of them could offer variations of their JLTV ideas in the near term to the Army -- but may instead defer any work on it for fear of disrupting their position in the protest deliberations.
That may be way off, but I'm curious on how that might play into it. Many argue that the tanker protests have disrupted America's ability to wage aerial combat and operations worldwide. I think that's a stretch. But in this case, we KNOW that lives are being lost and that something new needs to be fielded fast or more will die.
One of the potential problems the Army has not adequately addressed is that none of the MRAP vehicles are front-line vehicles, in the sense that they cannot operate in an environment approaching mid- to high-intensity combat. They can and do prove useful in stability and counterinsurgency operations, particularly in urban areas that require troops to conduct lots of presence patrols.
But in an environment where an enemy is equipped with large numbers of man-portable anti-tank weapons, of even the omnipresent low-tech RPG-7 variety, these vehicles are not survivable. They dont have the armor protection and are very big targets. While it makes sense in wartime to build vehicles tailored for specific combat environments, one has to wonder if the service has any kind of long term strategy for all these new heavily armored trucks it keeps buying.
This brings up another good point. MRAPs are good against IEDs but not so good against RPGs (I know why and where the vulnerabilities are, but won't discuss them here). So this new ATV will have to have some of the same armor innovations manufacturers have planned for the JLTV in order to meet the requirement.
It will be interesting to see how this develops and we'll bring you the latest as we get info.
-- Christian
Our media maven Ward Carroll must have done well on his last appearance because they asked him back onto the morning show at FOX (they must be hurtin' for guests)...
He'll be on around 9:30am EST tomorrow to talk about the LackMart Multiple Kill Vehicle hover test.
So be sure to tune in to see the show...
-- Christian
We ran a story this morning on Military.com about the Pentagon Inspector General report on the response by the Marine Corps to Urgent Universal Needs requests for MRAP-style vehicles. The IG posted a brief summary of its findings on the DoD web site, so take a look and assess if for yourself.
It seems to me the IG ruled on a very narrow set of factors, namely how did the Corps respond to an UNS of this nature -- when hundreds of UNSs were coming in and other commanders deemed M1114 Humvees a better match for the threat vs mobility equation. The whole UNS process was new and commanders were constantly looking over there shoulder to see how much heat they'd get on their prioritization of these requests. What was more important, scope covers or thigh holsters?
Here's what the IG said:
We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff establish procedures in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) in the Year of Execution, July 15, 2005, and that the Commanding General, MCCDC establish procedures in Marine Corps Order 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS), October 17, 2008, to enable Service requirements developers to forward urgent requirements that may have joint-Service applicability directly to the appropriate combatant commander for endorsement and subsequent submission to the Joint Staff for validation as a Joint Urgent Operational Need.
But I thought this line was most significant:
DoD was aware of the threat posed by mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in low-intensity conflicts and of the availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgent actions began in Iraq in 2003. Yet DoD did not develop requirements for, fund, or acquire MRAP-type vehicles for low-intensity conflicts that involved mines and IEDs. As a result, the Department entered into operations in Iraq without having taken available steps to acquire technology to mitigate the known mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines. We are making recommendations only to the Marine Corps because the scope of our audit was limited to a review of Marine Corps actions to address the IED threat. We plan to address other Services actions to counter the IED threat during future audits.
So, the IG is saying the Pentagon knew about the threat and did nothing about it? I can see this on one level but then I was there in summer of '03 and IEDs just weren't a threat at the time...No one was talking about them and most of the time we were rolling around Baghdad in soft vehicles without ever even thinking about mines or IEDs.
-- Christian
Suspicious happenings on the Varyag
Just all kinds of bad guys firing rockets these days...
Crunching the numbers: Mercs v. Soldiers
Afghanistan heating up
Just as rad as it sounds: Multiple Kill Vehicle Hover Test
--John Noonan
[From the headlines at Military.com]
An F-18 military jet approaching a Marine base crashed near a busy highway in a densely populated San Diego neighborhood Monday, sparking at least one house fire.
The pilot ejected, but it wasn't immediately clear whether the pilot or anyone on the ground was injured, officials said.
The plane crashed around noon Monday as it prepared to land at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, said Ian Gregor, a Federal Aviation Administration spokesman. The crash occurred two miles from the base.
Gregor did not know the pilot's condition or how many people were in the plane before it crashed near Interstate 805.
A high school sits near the crash site. Television news footage showed what appeared to be the remnants of a smoldering house and two cars on fire.
Steve Krasner, who lives a few blocks away in the earthquake-prone region, said he first thought the shaking generated by the crash was the long-anticipated "Big One."
He was in his kitchen when he heard two loud explosions and looked outside, then heard a larger blast.
"The house shook; the ground shook. It was like I was frozen in my place," Krasner said.
"It was bigger than any earthquake I ever felt," he said. "The flames were billowing overhead."
Dean Costa, who was about two blocks away at his father's house, said he felt the building vibrate, then made his way close to the crash site and saw two houses on fire and several cars explode.
"It was just crazy," said Costa, 22. "There was debris everywhere."
Maurice Luque, a spokesman for the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department, said he didn't know whether anyone on the ground was injured.
A Miramar spokeswoman said base workers were sent to the crash site.
"We are still trying to confirm the aircraft even belongs to us," said Marine Staff Sgt. Bobbie Bryant.
The F-18 is a supersonic jet used widely in the Navy and Marine Corps and by the Navy's stunt-flying Blue Angels. An F-18 crashed at Miramar in November 2006, but the pilot ejected safely.
Miramar, well known for its role in the movie "Top Gun," is home to some 10,000 Marines. It was operated by the Navy until 1996.
(Editor's note: Other sources report the aircraft was an F/A-18D attached to VFMAT-101. Although that model of aircraft normally has a two-man crew, the mishap aircraft was flown without anyone in the rear cockpit.)
-- Christian
In the Mumbai tragedy, it took three days for Indias police and commandos to overwhelm 10 fanatical fighters who killed some 160 people and wounded nearly 300. The attack speaks to the lethality of guerrilla fighters armed with fanatical fervor and small arms, the difficulties inherent to urban combat and the security challenge of the modern city as soft target.
After the five-plus year battle of Baghdad, Americans have become accustomed to snipers, IEDs and car bombs as the most common urban warfare tactics. The Lahskar-e-Taiba fighters were of a more dangerous breed than a suicide bomber who detonates him or herself in a crowd as the number of casualties was directly related to how long they stayed alive and their ammunition lasted. Although they embraced eventual martyrdom, they sought to delay it as long as possible so as to rack up a higher body count. That is a very difficult enemy to counter.
In a column penned last week, strategist Edward Luttwak called the Indian security forces response pathetically inadequate in quantity and quality. Instead of the 200 National Security Guard Black Cat commandos tardily dispatched to Mumbai, India should have sent 1,000, Luttwak says. The Indian government response was certainly shoddy, but it should also be kept in mind just how difficult and complex a tactical challenge the Indian security forces faced.
I was reminded of an article written some time back (December 2003) by former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen, of counterinsurgency fame, in that services excellent journal. In the piece, Kilcullen discussed close combat in complex terrain, defined as terrain where you cannot see as far as you can shoot.
An important point he makes is that more than sheer numbers, urban combat requires small, networked, mutually supporting semi-autonomous teams. Even big battles in urban terrain rapidly dissolve into a series of mini-battles fought in streets, courtyards and rooms in houses. If a thousand troops attack a hundred in complex terrain, what ensues is not one large, single battle, but several dozen individual duels and small-group engagements fought over a dispersed area. He used the Black Hawk Down Mogadishu battle as an example.
The Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters dispersed upon landing in Mumbai into two man teams and rapidly fanned out into the city. Countering such an enemy requires security forces that can also rapidly disperse and operate individually with very high levels of tactical skill. Even the standard ten man section may be too large for such battles, Kilcullen says. Instead, the four-man fire team may become the true building block for the close fight in the first quarter of the 21st century.
I would be curious to know how many countries possess troops with that required level of tactical skill and unit cohesion. Kilcullens piece in the Australian Army Journal brings up an interesting discussion as we contemplate how to counter what are sure to be future Mumbai style attacks and is well worth a read, along with an earlier piece he wrote in the June 2003 issue.
-- Greg Grant
Maintaining accountability and improving stewardship of the Air Force's nuclear program is the top priority, said the service's 19th chief of staff recently.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hailed a landmark nuclear deal signed with Russia on Friday as a "milestone in the history of our cooperation" after meeting here with President Dmitry Medvedev.
The head of the UN nuclear watchdog said that international efforts to halt Iranian nuclear activity have been a failure, according to an interview with the Los Angeles Times.
Our colleague Colin Clark, editor of DoD Buzz, is attending the 26th Army Science Conference in Orlando this week. He'll be updating the Buzz with his stories but the Army has gone all "Web 2.0" on us and is live streaming some of the presentations and panels.
Below is a video that was shown this morning to attendees. It looks like only two of the talks are archived on the official live cast site, but we'll have whatever content we can grab here on DT for you to peruse as we get it, so stay tuned.
-- Christian
Boeing announced today another successful test shoot of its Airborne Laser prototype.
This time technicians fired the laser using its tracking and control system to guide the beam through the nose-mounted turret at a simulated missile target.
Of course, this was all done on the ground.
It won't be until next year that the system will engage a missile target while both are in flight. But the news reminds us that behind the scenes, the ABL program -- and its offshoots -- are making quiet progress toward eventual fielding of a no-joke flying laser cannon.
Release follows in part:
During the test at Edwards Air Force Base, the laser beam traveled through the beam control/fire control system before exiting the aircraft through the nose-mounted turret. The beam control/fire control system steered and focused the beam onto a simulated ballistic-missile target.
"This test is significant because it demonstrated that the Airborne Laser missile defense program has successfully integrated the entire weapon system aboard the ABL aircraft," said Scott Fancher, vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems. "With the achievement of the first firing of the laser aboard the aircraft in September, the team has now completed the two major milestones it hoped to accomplish in 2008, keeping ABL on track to conduct the missile shootdown demonstration planned for next year."
Michael Rinn, Boeing vice president and ABL program director, said the next step for the program is a series of longer-duration laser firings through the beam control/fire control system.
"Once we complete those tests, we will begin demonstrating the entire weapon system in flight," Rinn said. "The team is meeting its commitment to deliver this transformational directed-energy weapon system in the near term."
-- Christian
Russia successfully tested Friday a sea-based missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, the military said, amid continued tension with Washington over missile defence.
Our friends over at Soldier Systems blog have been tracking an interesting story about whether the Russian army has copied a Finnish camo pattern...or whether the Russian soldier photographed wearing the curiously similar fatigues might have been going off the reservation a bit.
It's not very often that you run across articles in the NY Times on Soldier System topics, but the Russian Interior Ministrys latest camo pattern is allegedly a dead ringer for the Finnish Armys pattern. The pattern was reportedly worn by Russian Special Operations troops during the recent hostilities in Georgia. While the Russian Government has flatly denied copying the pattern, they have been known in the past to copy US Woodland pattern as well as German Flecktarn. Additionally, tipsters have alerted us to Russian versions of the Finnish m/05 pattern for sale on ebay within the last year. Obviously, considering a sizable common border and a past history of conflict with Russia, the Finns are a bit concerned.
[Note: Picture shows Russian special operations troops wearing Brit DPM, woodland and far left, the Finnish pattern]
Update:
In an update to the NY Times story of Finnish concerns over Russias purloining of their Armys camo pattern, Strike Hold has published a photo of Russian troops in Georgia wearing the Finnish m05 camo as well as a copy of Brit DPM.
Pakistan, which has relied on French defense suppliers, is buying German-made submarines for the first time, but is still technologically behind its nuclear rival India.
Various newspapers have reported that the MOD has requested £3.7 billion from the Treasury to cover the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Infantry Brigade Combat Team is about to get more lethal. With the Army's decision in June to transition Future Combat Systems technologies to the light infantry force, the Non-Line of Sight-Launch System is slated to join the IBCT's portfolio of weapon systems in 2011.
Military helicopters over Quantico, are a common sight, yet many individuals watching do not automatically assume there is no one inside.
Russia will from December 2009 deploy its new RS-24 intercontinental missile, designed to counter defence systems like the controversial US missile shield, the military announced Friday.
Military Sealift Command-chartered high speed vessel HSV-2 Swift (HSV 2) along with various embarked Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force units departed Louisiana Nov. 25 for a five-month deployment in support of Southern Partnership Station (SPS).
Afghan President Hamid Karzai says he is powerless to halt U.S. airstrikes in his country and he would stop American warplanes if he could.
Brazil revealed that it had bought 12 attack helicopters from Russia on October 23, after a visit here by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev Wednesday.
In a speech given at the Berlin Security Conference today, Thursday 27 November 2008, British Defence Secretary John Hutton has said that NATO must confront the security issues of our time and succeed in Afghanistan to maintain its crucial credibility.
Coalition offs gender confused Taliban commander
The dime bio on Lashkar-e-Taiba
Israeli radar sees through walls
Memphis Belle restored
New Xmas gift hotness: the "wifle"
--John Noonan
The rapid advancement of cyber attacks and the emergence of cyber warfare have caught government and military leaders around the world off guard. Decision making in time requiring defensive measures or military crisis is guided by doctrine and rules of engagement, but in the case of cyber attacks and cyber warfare they do not currently exist. The complexities and unique characteristics of cyber warfare mandate establishing Cyber Attack and Warfare Rules of Engagement (CAWRoE).
Cyber warfare is different than the conventional war in many ways. It is this difference that will challenge the minds of experts around the world when they attempt to create cyber warfare doctrine and ROE. To frame this discussion, below you will find two definitions that put this challenge in context.
Definition - Cyber Warfare & Terrorism - "The premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to cause harm or further social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives. Or to intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives." Source: This definition was published in the U.S. Army Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism Handbook 1.02. This definition was written by Kevin Coleman back in 2004 for an online article.
Definition - Rules of Engagement - Rules of engagement date at least to the Middle Ages in Europe. In military terms this refers to a directive issued by a military authority controlling the use and degree of force, esp. specifying circumstances and limitations for engaging in combat. The directive delineates the limitations and circumstances under which forces will initiate and prosecute combat engagement with other forces encountered. Source: This definition is based on multiple authorities' sources and combined to clearly articulate ROE.
NOTE-- After months of research, we will soon publish a paper that addresses the question: "What constitutes an act of cyber war?"
History has shown that ROE are often over controlled and regulated by politicians and military leaders. It is anticipated that this will also be the case as it relates to cyber attacks and warfare. In addition, commanders and government leaders at all levels must understand the situation, complexities and uncertainty they face.
The increase in complexity, technical aspects and difficulty in tracing the cyber attacks back to the aggressor will combine to increase the difficulty of creating the ROE for cyber. Careful crafting of cyber ROE is required to diminish ambiguities that could caused delays in actions when the use of force is required and will surely lead to increased implication on the United States.
Cyber attack and warfare rules of engagement will undoubtedly require hundreds of pages to establish a decision framework. That being said, there are a few critical areas that will pose the most significant challenge to policy makers. One of these areas will be the level of confidence in the identification of the entity behind an attack on a nation. Tracing and tracking cyber attacks back to those responsible is not an easy task. Usually this takes months or years not minutes and hours. Current intelligence and surveillance capabilities will provide only minimal assistance in this effort. Although promising research on tracking and tracing cyber attacks is currently underway and advances are occurring on a regular basis, we are far from being able to rapidly identify the party or parties behind the attack with the high degree of confidence and hard evidence necessary to launch an offensive cyber response. At the present time, the newness of cyber attacks and weapons coupled with their potential, but unproven power and the uncertainty about how they might be used, have pushed the decision around the response to cyber attacks all the way to the top and in the hands of the President of the United States.
Conclusion
Over 140 countries around the world have cyber weapons development efforts underway but lack a comprehensive doctrine and legal framework for responding to cyber attacks as well as using offensive cyber weapons against attackers and adversaries. President-elect Barack Obama's national security team will have to rapidly establish the rules of engagement as they relate to cyber attacks and all out cyber warfare. His national security team is said to include: Sarah Sewall, Tom Donilon, Wendy R. Sherman, Michèle A. Flournoy, John P. White, Robert R. Beers, Clark Kent Ervin, Gayle E. Smith, Aaron Williams, John O. Brennan and Judith A. ("Jami") Miscik.
The United States Military has an expansive arsenal of sophisticated cyber weapons at its disposal, policy makers have yet to define the rules of engagement that govern when and how to use them. In a briefing earlier this year I said: "This is totally uncharted territory for policy makers. The characteristics of cyber attacks coupled with the operational aspects of cyber weapons make this a unique challenge."
This remains the case and time is growing short before the next significant cyber attack is launched. Cyber warfare requires new rules of engagement.
A cool vid for a pre-Thanksgiving (for our U.S. readers) day...
(Gouge: militaryphotos.net)
-- Christian
Obama might have made his decision, but did he consult Defense Tech readers first?
For a jauntier and updated version of some of my F-22 coverage, you can tune into my latest podcast. I did the interview with Addison Schonland, president and founder of Innovation Analysis Group, a consulting firm based in San Diego.
We spoke about the Pentagons out-maneuvering Congress on the F-22 funding and John Youngs subsequent comments slamming the Raptors availability, maintenance and costs.
-- Colin Clark